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Many economists believe that the stock market plays an important role in efficiently allocating capital 
to its most productive uses. This standard story of the stock market was called into question by events 
in the late 1990s, when some observers believed that stock market overvaluation – or a bubble - led to 
overinvestment. Both the standard and overinvestment stories involve discount rates and, to 
differentiate between the two stories, this paper examines the discount rates used by firms in making 
their investment decisions. 
We use a revealed preference approach that relies on the pattern of investment spending – combined 
with investment theory – to estimate the discount rates used by managers. The standard story predicts 
that firms with high stock prices and good investment opportunities should have discount rates that do 
not differ systematically from the risk-adjusted market rate. The overinvestment story predicts that 
firms with high stock prices and poor investment opportunities should have discount rates consistently 
below the market rate. 
Based on a panel dataset of over 50,000 firm-year observations, we find support for both stories. The 
behavior of high stock price firms with good measured investment opportunities is best described by 
the standard story, while the overinvestment story provides the most appropriate interpretation of the 
behavior of high stock price firms with poor investment opportunities. Firms in this latter category 
accumulate between 15.1% and 45.2% too much capital. These estimates suggest that, even before 
they burst, bubbles adversely affect economic activity by misallocating capital. 
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 Do Bubbles Lead To Overinvestment?: 
A Revealed Preference Approach 
 
Are bubbles just a zero-sum game among financial market participants, or do they 
have real effects on investments, consumption, and employment? … This, in our 
view, is the most important question. …  Many more such papers are needed.   
 
  Bhattacharya  and  Yu,  Review of Financial Studies (2008), pp. 8-9. 
 
1.   Introduction 
  Many economists believe that market prices do a good job of allocating resources.  In 
particular, the stock market is seen as playing an important role in efficiently allocating capital to 
its most productive uses.  The stock market price of a firm represents the expected present value 
of future dividends -- the "fundamental" price.  Increases in the stock market price provide 
incentives for managers to issue equity and attract capital to their firms. 
  This standard view of the stock market was called into question by events in the late 
1990s.  Scores of commentators -- including many economists – claim that there was stock 
market overvaluation in the late 1990s.  Moreover, there is a widespread belief that stock market 
overvaluation -- or a bubble -- led to overinvestment, especially in ".com" companies and 
Internet-related firms, such as those in telecommunications.
1  A bubble might affect investment 
if investors become unduly excited about particular firms and, in their excitement, they bid up 
the prices of these firms (Shiller, 2000, 2001; Shleifer, 2000).  Overvalued shares lower the 
perceived cost of equity capital.  If managers act on this lower perceived cost, they would issue 
new shares, lower the discount rate used in evaluating investment projects, and increase 
investment spending.
2 
  The central core of the standard story of capital allocation involves rates of return and 
discount rates.  Favorable shocks -- an increase in demand or a technical improvement – raise 
returns to capital for the fortunate firm (Cochrane, 2001; Fama, 1976).  A firm earning high 
returns (relative to its cost of capital or discount rate) increases its capital stock until the return 
                                                 
1 We are aware of the controversies that surround the use of the term “bubble” (see, for example, 
O’Hara, 2008).  In this paper, bubble is merely a shorthand for stock market overvaluation.  
       
2  Baker (2009) reviews studies that have focused on the role of the supply of finance for 
investment spending.    
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on the marginal unit of capital again equals the discount rate.  Absent externalities, capital is 
being allocated optimally.   
  The central core of the overinvestment story also involves rates of return and discount 
rates.  A bubble lowers the discount rate, leading to higher investment.  If managers use a 
discount rate below the market rate, they would invest too much, the rate of return on their 
investment would be too low, and capital would be misallocated. 
  This paper focuses on the central core of these two stories by examining the discount 
rates used by firms in making their investment decisions.  One possible way to measure discount 
rates would be to survey managers.  This approach has many advantages but, for our purposes, it 
has two key disadvantages.  First, we cannot reach back in time to find out the discount rate used 
by managers at a time when their firm might have been overvalued.  Second, there are potential 
issues of selection bias due to differential response rates across firms with different 
characteristics.  Instead, we use a revealed preference approach that relies on the investment 
decisions of firms -- combined with investment theory -- to estimate the discount rates actually 
used by managers of U.S. firms.   
  To assess the potential role of bubbles, we focus on a class of firms – high-price firms -- 
that financial economists have identified as possibly overvalued.  The high-price portfolio 
comprises firms with high stock market prices relative to a simple accounting measure of 
fundamentals.  This class of firms is frequently referred to as “growth” firms.  Such a label 
would be inconsistent with the perspective taken in this paper.  Firms facing fundamental shocks 
and whose behavior is described by the standard story could be considered growth firms.  
However, this label is inappropriate for those firms whose high stock price is due to bubbles and 
whose behavior is described by the overinvestment story. 
  The standard story in economics holds that firms may enter the high-price portfolio as a 
result of favorable shocks that provide the firms with good investment opportunities and thus 
increase their stock market price.  The overinvestment story claims that the high stock price of 
high-price firms is based on investor sentiment, not good investment opportunities.  We therefore 
divide the firms in the high-price portfolio into those with good or poor investment opportunities.  
If the standard story applies to all high-price firms, firms with both good and poor investment  
 
3
opportunities should have discount rates equal to the market rate (suitably adjusted for risk).
3  If 
the misallocation story applies to all high-price firms, both sub-classes of firms should have 
discount rates that are lower than the market rate.  Our econometric work suggests something in 
between.  The estimated discount rate is above the market rate for firms with good investment 
opportunities.  For firms with poor investment opportunities, the discount rate is below the 
market rate.  The difference in discount rates (relative to risk-adjusted market rates) is 
economically and statistically significant.  Thus the standard story describes high-price firms 
with good investment opportunities and the misallocation story high-price firms with poor 
investment opportunities. 
  We then undertake three robustness checks.  First, the benchmark results are based on 
using demand shocks as a measure of investment opportunities.  We examine cost shocks as an 
alternative way to identify recent news about investment opportunities.  Firms with favorable 
cost shocks should have relatively good investment opportunities.  Using cost shocks as a 
measure of investment opportunities, we confirm the benchmark results – the estimated discount 
rate for high-price firms with poor investment opportunities is below the market rate.  It is 
significantly lower than the discount rate used by high-price firms with good investment 
opportunities.  Second, insofar as investment opportunities may be difficult to measure, we also 
examine the discount rate wedge for high-price firms whose shareholders have long horizons.  
We would not expect firms described by these two characteristics to have a discount rate wedge 
that differs systematically from zero.  This prediction is borne-out by the empirical results.  
Third, we take a different but complementary approach that evaluates a series of restricted 
econometric models in terms of J tests.  These misspecified models are useful in evaluating the 
standard and overinvestment stories, and the test results are consistent with the above findings.   
The paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 derives the Euler equation from a formal 
optimization problem that is the basis for the econometric analysis.  Section 3 discusses the panel 
dataset (details are provided in the Appendix) and the summary statistics that describe various 
subsets of firms.  Section 4 presents our benchmark results with this Euler equation and uncovers 
strong evidence for the empirical relevance of both the standard and overinvestment stories for 
appropriate subsets of firms.  Section 5 contains several robustness checks.  Section 6 concludes.     
                                                 
3 The discount rate will be above the market rate if finance constraints prevent firms from 
equating the discount rate to the market rate on a period-by-period basis.   
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2.   Model 
  Our estimation strategy exploits the intertemporal pattern of investment spending to 
“reveal” the discount rate guiding investment decisions.   The Euler investment equation has 
been a workhorse model in the investment literature and has been used by, among others, 
Shapiro (1986), Whited (1992), Hubbard and Kashyap (1992), and Chirinko and Schaller (2001, 
2004) to study investment spending.  Being a first-order condition for profit-maximization, the 
Euler equation is closely-tied to optimal firm behavior.  Moreover, investment and discount rate 
variables enter explicitly (unlike, for example, the equally popular Brainard-Tobin Q equation), 
and thus it is straightforward to introduce a parameter representing the discount rate wedge.  
  The Euler equation that is the basis for our estimates can be obtained through informal 
and formal derivations.
4  The informal derivation begins with the net present value relation that 












= ∑ ,         ( 1 )  
where R  is the real discount factor equal to 
1 (1 ) r δ
− ++  in the absence of bubbles (where r is the 
real risk-adjusted discount rate and δ  is the economic rate of depreciation),  tj MPK +  is the 
marginal product of capital associated with this incremental capital project, and  t MIC  is the 
marginal investment cost.  The latter term is composed of two parts, the purchase cost of the 
capital project relative to the price of output ((/)
IY
t p p ) and the marginal adjustment cost 
( t MAC ).  Equation (1) is based on the timing assumptions that revenues accrue at the end of the 
period, while investment costs are paid at the beginning of the period.  It prove convenient to 
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4 The formal derivation can be found in any of the Euler equation studies cited above.  The 
informal derivation was presented in Chirinko and Schaller (2004), which also contains an 
intuitive discussion of the Euler equation (p. 185).    
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where both sides of the equation have been multiplied by an extra R.  Equation (3) can be 













= ∑ .         ( 4 )  
The difficulty with using any of these equations in estimation is that they contain an infinite 
number of future variables.  This problem is overcome by a suitable transformation (akin to a 
Koyck transformation in distributed lag models).  In this case, we subtract equation (4) from (2) 
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      ( 5 )  
  The Euler equation in (5) can also be obtained as a first-order condition in a formal 
optimization problem.  We assume that the firm chooses labor and capital inputs to maximize its 
market value.  The firm is constrained by three technologies.  The production technology 
([, ] tt FLK ) relates output ( t Y ) to the labor ( t L ) and capital ( t K ) inputs and to a stochastic 
technology shock.  The adjustment cost technology ( [ , ] tt GI K , where  t I  is investment) affects 
the acquisition of capital (though not labor).  Adjustment costs are valued by the price of 
foregone output, are affected by a stochastic shock, and are convex in investment.  The latter is a 
critical assumption, as it forces the firm to consider its future plans when making current 
decisions.  The accumulation technology determines the existing capital stock as a weighted sum 
of past investments, where the weights follow a declining exponential or geometric pattern.  
Moreover, the firm is a price-taker in its input market, though not necessarily in its output 
market.  With the value maximization objective and these four constraints, optimal behavior for a 
forward-looking firm is determined by variational, optimal control, or dynamic programming 
methods.    
  In order to implement the Euler equation, we need to specify the MIC, MPK, and R 
variables.  The MIC is specified as follows, 
   (/)
IY
tt t MIC p p MAC =+   ,         ( 6 )  
  
2
01 2 (/ ) (/ ) tt t MAC I K I K αα α =+ +   ,        ( 7 )  
where  t MAC  is a second-order Taylor approximation to the adjustment cost function,  [ , ] t GI K .  
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  The MPK is determined by an application of Euler’s Theorem of Homogeneous 
Functions to the following relation between output and the production and adjustment cost 
technologies, 
   [, ] [, ] tt t t t YF L K G I K =− ,         ( 8 )  
to yield the following expression for the MPK, 
   (/ ) ( / ) ( / ) tt t t t MPK SALES K COST K I K MAC ζ =− +     (9) 
where SALES is net nominal sales, COST is the nominal cost of goods sold and selling, general, 
and administrative expenses, and ζ  is a parameter capturing the combined effects of imperfect 
competition and non-constant returns to scale in production.  When the firm is a price-taker in its 
output market and  [ , ] tt FLK  exhibits constant returns to scale, ζ  equals 1.  Deviations from 
these characteristics results in deviations of ζ  from unity.   
  The discount factor, R, is generalized in two ways from the specification reported for 
equation (1).  We recognize the possibility that our specification of the discount rate, r, may not 
be complete and may include a parameter, Θ , common to all firms.  Of most importance to this 
study is the discount rate wedge, μ , that enters the specification only for subsets of firms and is 
multiplied by an indicator variable, Ω.  This indicator variable varies by firm and over time and 
takes a value of 1 when firm i enters either the high-price PIO or high-price GIO portfolios, and 
leads to the following specification of the discount factor, 
  
1
,, ( ) , , , (1 )
PIO PIO GIO GIO
it it is t it it Rr δμ μ
− =+ + + Θ + Ω + Ω  ,       (10) 
where the firm (i), time (t), and sector (s) subscripts are explicit and i(s) indicates that the 
variable is available at the sector level for firm i.   
  The Euler equation is estimated by GMM with instruments that are lags of the variables 
appearing in the Euler equation,  
  
() () ( )
() ()
()
1, 1 ( ) , 2 1 , 1 ( ) , 1
2
,1 , 1 , 2 1 , 1 , 2
1 1 ( ) ,1 ( ) ,1 ,1 ,1
1( / ), 1 1 ,
1( ) , 1( ) ,
1( ) , ,
−− − − − −
−−− −−−
−− − − − −
⎧⎫ −− + +
⎪⎪ ⎪⎪ =− − ⎨⎬
⎪⎪
−− Ω Ω ⎪⎪ ⎩⎭
Y
ti t i s i t t i t i s t
it t it it t it it
IY P I O G I O
tti s t i s t i t i t
SALES p K r
WI K I K
zup p
ττ δ
ττ    (11) 
 
where  1 t τ −  is the corporate income tax rate,  1 t u −  is the investment tax credit rate, and  1 t z −  is the 
present value of depreciation allowances.    
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3.   Dataset 
  We examine U.S. firms for two reasons.  First, the United States has the most richly 
developed capital markets in the world and is therefore less likely to suffer from overvaluation 
and overinvestment.  Second, the maximum amount of firm-level data is available for the United 
States.  This latter factor is important to obtain a sufficient number of firms in the high-price 
portfolio, which contains only the top two deciles in a given year.  This portfolio is further 
reduced by sorting by investment opportunities.  Most of the empirical work is based on more 
than 50,000 firm-year observations.  The panel data consists of a representative sample of U.S. 
publicly traded firms for the period 1980-2004.  In fact, the sample approaches the universe of 
U.S. publicly traded firms.  The primary data source is CompuStat with additional information 
obtained from CRSP and various sources of industry and aggregate data.  Details about the 
dataset are contained in the Appendix. 
  We maximize the size of the dataset used in estimation in three ways.  First, we use an 
unbalanced panel, and thus avoid the severe data restrictions imposed by a balanced panel.  This 
choice has the further advantage of attenuating survivorship bias.  Second, even in an unbalanced 
panel, some methods of constructing the replacement value of the capital stock require long 
strings of contiguous data to implement the perpetual inventory formula.  We partly avoid this 
problem by tailoring our algorithm to preserve observations when there are gaps in the data and 
to use data that are more frequently available in CompuStat (e.g., when we find evidence of 
substantial acquisitions and divestitures, we use data on property, plant, and equipment in 
addition to the capital expenditure data).  An additional problem posed by the perpetual 
inventory formula is its dependence on an initial or seed value of the capital stock drawn from 
financial statements.  This initial value can be a particularly poor measure of capital’s 
replacement cost that distorts the computed capital stock (K) until the impact of the initial value 
is largely depreciated.  One solution to this problem is to compute the capital stock for many 
years before using these data in estimation, but this approach discards a substantial number of 
observations.  As an alternative, we adopt the procedure discussed in detail in Chirinko and 
Schaller (2005) that computes an adjustment factor for the initial value taken from financial 
statements.  Third, the Euler equation and the instruments we have chosen require only three 
years of contiguous data.  All of the estimates reported below are based on sample sizes that 
exceed 50,000 firm-year observations.   
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The real risk-adjusted market discount rate (rt) is constructed in several steps.  We begin 
with a weighted-average of the nominal returns to debt and equity, where the weights vary by 
sector.  The nominal return to debt is adjusted for the tax deductibility of interest payments.  The 
nominal return to equity is based on the CAPM, and thus accounts for systematic risk.  The 
nominal weighted-average is converted to a real return with an inflation adjustment that varies 
across sectors and over time.    
  The other variables used in this study are constructed as follows.  Gross nominal 
investment is capital expenditures computed in a two-step procedure.  We begin with the data on 
capital expenditures (CompuStat item 128). CompuStat does not always have reliable data for 
the changes to the capital stock associated with large acquisitions or divestitures, and we modify 
the algorithm of Chirinko, Fazzari, and Meyer (1999) to adjust the reported investment data.  If 
the financial statement data indicate a substantial acquisition or divestiture, we use accounting 
identities to derive a more accurate measure of investment that replaces the data from item 128.  
Net Sales is CompuStat item 12.  This nominal investment series is converted to a real 
investment series (I) by dividing by a sector specific price deflator.  Sales growth (SG) is the 
annual growth rate in nominal net sales (S) divided by a sector specific price deflator.  Variable 
costs is the sum of the Cost of Goods Sold (CompuStat item 41) and Selling, General, and 
Administrative Expense (CompuStat item 189; when this item is not reported, it is set to zero.)  
The depreciation rate is taken from the BEA, and is allowed to vary across industries and over 
time.  The relative price of investment is the ratio of the price of investment to the price of 
output.  These industry-specific, implicit price deflators are taken from the BEA; the relative 
price series is adjusted for corporate income taxes.  New share issues (NSI) are measured as the 
ratio of the proceeds from equity issues relative to nominal investment spending.  The marginal 
product of capital (MPK) is computed as described in equation (9).   
  We determine whether a firm is in the high-price portfolio in a given year using the 
Sales/Price ratio, the ratio of net nominal sales to the nominal value of common equity.  The 
Sales/Price ratio has several key advantages: sales is a relatively straightforward accounting 
concept, rarely extremely small, and never negative.
5   Portfolios are formed by sorting all the 
firms for which the necessary data is available in a given year by the Sales/Price ratio.  The two 
                                                 
5 The book/market ratio is also used in the literature, but it has many disadvantages.  See, for 
example, the discussion of book/market in Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994).  
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deciles with the lowest Sales/Price ratio – equivalently, the highest stock price (relative to sales) 
-- in a given year are classified as high-price firms.  The portfolio formation procedure allows a 
firm to be a high-price firm this year but not in a subsequent year.  In fact, it is common for firms 
to move in and out of the high-price portfolio.   
  Firms that enter the high-price portfolio are further classified by investment opportunities 
(IO), which are measured by real sales growth over the prior three years.   Firms with poor 
investment opportunities (PIO) or good investment opportunities (GIO) are those firms with 
sales growth in the bottom and top quartiles of high-price firms, respectively.  Thus, in a given 
year, firms that are in the high-price, poor investment opportunity portfolio represent 
approximately 5% of the firms with serviceable data for that year.   
  When analyzing investment, we use the capital stock to control for size, which is 
frequently measured by the equity value of the firm (especially in finance research).  In the 
current study concerned with stock market bubbles, this approach would be clearly inappropriate.  
Instead, we use the capital stock calculated using a standard perpetual inventory algorithm.  The 
primary variable we analyze is the ratio of investment to the capital stock (I/K).  There are a few 
extreme outliers for I/K.  This is a common issue in panel data studies involving I/K.  We 
address this issue by deleting the 1% tails of the I/K distribution.   
  Summary statistics are presented in three separate panels in Table 1.  Panel A contains 
the Sales/Price ratio defining high-price portfolios and SG and Cost/Sales ratio defining firms 
with poor or good investment opportunities.  Panel B contains variables describing these 
portfolios.  As measured by the capital stock, the median high-price firm is less than half as large 
as the median firm in the sample.  The median high-price firm expands more rapidly than the 
median firm; the respective I/K ratios are 0.135 and 0.087.  Among the high-price firms, those 
with good investment opportunities (I/K equal to 0.151) are expanding at nearly twice the rate as 
firms with poor investment opportunities (I/K equal to 0.077).  Consistent with this expansion, 
NSI (new share issues normalized by I) is very large for GIO firms.  Moreover, high-price firms 
with poor investment opportunities have higher NSI than the median firm in the full sample 
(which includes all firms, not just those with high stock prices). The NSI is 0.381 for PIO firms, 
compared with 0.187 for the median firm. This active participation in equity markets by PIO 
firms resonates with the possibility that they are exploiting the availability of cheap equity 
finance due to a bubble in their share price.    
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Table 1    Summary Statistics  
 
A. Variables Determining Portfolios 
 N  Mean  25%  50%  75%  Std  Dev.  Skewness  Kurtosis 
Sales/Price              
   All  55021  77.777  0.691  1.477  3.086  6459.91  117.120  15191.56 
   High-Price   6019  0.340  0.137  0.249  0.403  0.770  42.373  2332.31 
   High-Price & Poor IO  1162  0.385  0.120  0.252  0.416  1.434  28.829  917.257 
   High-Price & Good IO  962  0.322  0.097  0.213  0.398  0.448  7.010  87.483 
              
SG              
   All  55021  0.137  -0.046  0.061  0.199  1.241  71.092  6734.88 
   High-Price   6019  0.522  -0.0001  0.175  0.444  3.606  26.090  849.660 
   High-Price & Poor IO  1162  0.958  -0.059  0.118  0.482  6.678  16.274  312.515 
   High-Price & Good IO  962  0.663  -0.009  0.261  0.609  3.577  20.900  528.662 
                
Cost/Sales                
   All  55021  0.988  0.842  0.903  0.959  3.606  199.842  43914.78 
   High-Price   6019  1.574  0.707  0.841  1.216  10.862  66.700  4863.65 
   High-Price & Poor IO  1162  2.617  0.751  0.977  1.599  23.962  31.962  1060.24 
   High-Price & Good IO  962  2.119  0.827  1.083  1.760  4.275  8.943  100.892 
 
 
B. Variables Describing Portfolios 
 N  Mean  25%  50%  75%  Std  Dev.  Skewness  Kurtosis 
K               
   All  55021  1463.20  16.293  78.871  427.381  12632.77  86.369  12394.70 
   High-Price   6019  789.291  7.265  35.520  276.902  3049.90  9.983  160.613 
   High-Price & Poor IO  1162  648.392  3.944  17.817  183.375  3073.55  12.049  200.205 
   High-Price & Good IO  962  269.783  4.314  14.148  53.328  1428.99  8.919  91.768 
               
I               
   All  55021  122.878  1.086  6.561  37.890  780.978  32.571  1757.34 
   High-Price   6019  104.235  0.636  4.546  34.066  493.473  14.032  279.405 
   High-Price & Poor IO  1162  53.035  0.219  1.270  12.633  207.757  6.926  58.972 
   High-Price & Good IO  962  41.806  0.311  1.529  9.407  217.249  9.679  115.579 
               
I/K               
   All  55021  0.130  0.041  0.087  0.165  0.140  2.334  6.834 
   High-Price   6019  0.199  0.052  0.135  0.283  0.196  1.461  1.800 
   High-Price & Poor IO  1162  0.122  0.030  0.077  0.157  0.141  2.286  6.642 
   High-Price & Good IO  962  0.223  0.055  0.151  0.338  0.215  1.210  0.792 
               
NSI               
   All  48725  15.425  0.000  0.187  2.845  118.503  37.817  2388.67 
   High-Price   4969  26.791  0.057  1.195  8.310  150.421  20.263  566.958 
   High-Price & Poor IO  978  19.506  0.000  0.381  4.270  178.792  21.783  535.091 




Table 1    Summary Statistics (continued) 
 
C. Other Variables Entering The Estimating Equation 
  N  Mean  25%  50%  75% Std  Dev. Skewness Kurtosis 
MPK               
   All  55021  0.870  0.0405  0.231  0.760  2.126  4.686  28.095 
   High-Price   6019  1.749  0.028  0.509  2.020  3.474  2.621  8.151 
   High-Price & Poor IO  1162  0.519  -0.051  0.092  0.623  2.095  4.092  29.637 
   High-Price & Good IO  962  1.857  -0.112  0.310  2.529  3.980  2.124  5.087 
               
.r               
   All  55021  0.120  0.093  0.120  0.146  0.037  0.429  2.829 
   High-Price   6019  0.116  0.085  0.111  0.146  0.047  1.277  5.274 
   High-Price & Poor IO  1162  0.121  0.085  0.112  0.148  0.056  1.695  5.526 
   High-Price & Good IO  962  0.116  0.088  0.113  0.139  0.043  1.503  6.882 
                
p
I / p
Y                
   All  55021  1.032  0.871  1.000  1.123  0.287  1.718  5.704 
   High-Price   6019  1.035  0.807  1.000  1.147  0.331  1.541  3.242 
   High-Price & Poor IO  1162  0.994  0.767  1.000  1.121  0.298  1.349  3.772 




The variables appearing in the tables are computed for the period 1980 to 2004 and are defined 
as follows:  Sales/Price is the ratio of nominal sales to nominal common equity value; SG is real 
sales growth; Cost/Sales is the ratio of nominal costs of goods sold to nominal sales; K is the real 
replacement cost of the stock of capital in property, plant, and equipment in millions of 1996 
dollars; I is real investment in property, plant, and equipment in millions of 1996 dollars; NSI is 
the ratio of new share issues to nominal investment spending; MPK is the marginal product of 
capital; r is the real risk-adjusted market discount rate; p
I/p
Y is the ratio of the price of investment 
goods to the price of output.  Details concerning the definitions, construction, and sources of the 
data are discussed in Section 3 and the Appendix.  
 
  Panel C contains variables other than I/K entering the estimating equation.  Consistent 
with the robust investment opportunities available to high-price GIO firms, their median MPK of 
0.310 is much larger than that for the median high-price PIO firm (0.092) or the median firm 
(0.231).  The values of the remaining variables – the real risk-adjusted market rate and the  
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relative price of investment goods – are similar across subsets of firms.
6  Taken together, these 
results suggest that investment opportunities and MPK’s are the key differences between high-
price PIO and GIO firms, and hence will play an important role for our estimates of the discount 
rate wedge.        
 
4.   Benchmark Empirical Results 
  This section presents estimates of the discount rate wedge based on the Euler equation (5) 
and the investment behavior of high-price firms at the time of portfolio formation.  To attempt to 
differentiate between the standard and overinvestment stories, the high-price portfolio is divided 
by the investment opportunities available to firms.  If the standard story applies to all firms in the 
high-price portfolio, firms with either PIO or GIO should use discount rates that do not differ 
systematically from their risk-adjusted market rates.  However, if the overinvestment story is 
relevant for a subset of firms in the high-price portfolio, their actual discount rate should be 
below their risk-adjusted market rate.  This situation is most likely to occur for high-price PIO 
firms.  Thus, the discount rate wedge, represented by μ and defined as the difference between 
the actual discount rate used by the firm and its risk-adjusted market rate, will allow us to 
discriminate between the standard and overinvestment stories.    
  We use the Euler equation to estimate the discount rate wedge for the high-price firms 
with poor ( PIO μ ) and good ( GIO μ ) investment opportunities, respectively.  In the first column of 
Table 2,   PIO μ  is -0.195, a result that is both economically and statistically significant and  
consistent with the overinvestment story.  By contrast,  GIO μ  is very close to zero, which is 
consistent with the standard story.  The Wald test reported in the second row evaluates the 
hypothesis that  PIO GIO μ= μ and is computed by the delta method.  The null hypothesis of equal 
discount rate wedges is rejected with a p-value of 0.021.  These results provide strong evidence 
for the importance of differentiating between classes of firms and for the empirical relevance of 
both the standard and overinvestment stories.   
                                                 
6 The median and mean value of r is approximately 0.120.  This figure is consistent with survey 
evidence.  Poterba and Summers (1995) report estimates of the average real hurdle rate 
indicating that r is 0.122.  This estimate has been confirmed in a study by Meier and Tarhan 
(2007), who report a comparable financial cost of capital of between 0.119 and 0.141.    
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It t 0 1 G[ I, K : , ] αα  3.657 3.016 5.023 
II t t 0 1 G[ I , K: , ] αα  0.445 0.366 0.589 
 
 















GMM estimates are based on equation (5) and on panel data for the period 1980 to 2004.  Firms 
are placed in the high-price portfolio if their ratio of equity value to sales is in the highest two 
deciles.  The 
PIO μ , 
GIO μ , and 
LH μ  parameters are the discount rate wedges for high-price firms 
with poor investment opportunities (PIO), with good investment opportunities (GIO), and with 
long horizons (LH), respectively.  Investment opportunities are measured in column (1) by sales 
growth, defined as real sales growth over the prior three years, and in column (2) by the cost 
ratio, defined as the ratio of nominal costs to nominal sales over the previous three years.  Firms 
with poor investment opportunities are those firms in the high-price portfolio with sales growth 
in the bottom quartile or the cost ratio in the top quartile.  The portfolio for good investment 
opportunities is formed in a similar way for the top quartile for sales growth and the bottom 
quartile for the cost ratio.  Horizons are measured by share turnover, defined as the mean (over 
the year) of the daily ratio of the volume of shares traded to shares outstanding at the end of the 
day.  Firms with long horizons are those with share turnover in the prior year above the median 
for all observations in the prior year.  All portfolios are formed based on beginning-of-period 
values and are reevaluated every year.  The Wald statistic is computed by the delta method and 
evaluates the hypothesis that  PIO GIO μμ = in columns (1) and (2) and the hypothesis that  LH μ 0 =  
in column (3); p-values are in brackets.  The ζ  parameter captures deviations from constant 
returns to scale or perfect competition; a value of ζ  less than unity is consistent with either 
decreasing returns to scale regardless of the degree of competition in the output market or 
increasing returns to scale and a sufficient degree of imperfect competition to force the marginal 
return to capital below its average return.  In either case, the firm is earning positive economic 
rents.  The α parameters are from the marginal adjustment cost function defined in equation (7).  
The  It t 0 1 t G[ I, K : , ] M A C αα=  statistic is the marginal adjustment cost function; the 
II t t 0 1 G[ I , K: , ] αα statistic is the curvature of the adjustment cost function.  Both adjustment 
cost statistics depend on the estimated α parameters and are evaluated at the median values  t I 
and  t K .  The J statistic is the Hansen-Sargan statistic for overidentification; p-values are in 
brackets.  N is the number of firm/year observations.  The instruments are discussed in Section 2.  
Details concerning the definitions, construction, and sources of the data are discussed in Section 
3 and the Appendix.  Standard errors are in parentheses, and ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
  Three additional results presented in column (1) are worth noting.  First, the ζ  parameter, 
which captures deviations from constant returns to scale or perfect competition, is less than one.  
While the difference from unity is statistically significant, it would not appear to be 
economically important.  Second, marginal adjustment costs are positive and increasing, and thus 
the adjustment cost function is convex.  This property is required by the optimization problem  
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presented in Section 2 that underlies the Euler equation.  Third, the Hansen-Sargan J test 
evaluating the overidentifying restrictions fails to reject the model, thus providing some 
assurance of the reasonableness of our empirical specification.      
  The point estimate of  PIO 0.195 μ= −  indicates a substantial misallocation of capital.  In 
order to draw the implications of bubbles for capital formation, we need to assess the impact of 
PIO μ  on the incentive to accumulate capital and then the impact of this enhanced incentive on 
capital accumulation.  Recall that our estimates of  PIO μ  and  GIO μ  apply to the lowest and 
highest quartile of high-price firms, respectively, sorted by investment opportunities.  We 
assume that this wedge would decline evenly between these two extremes, and hence the average 
value for the change in the discount rate wedge for all high-price firms is  0.100 Δμ=− .  
Lowering the discount rate by -0.100 leads to a 37.7% decline in the user cost of capital (see the 
Appendix for the computations).  The impact of these enhanced incentives on capital formation 
depends on the degree to which capital substitutes for other factors in the production function.  
Estimates of this elasticity of substitution have varied widely from 0.40 (Chirinko, Fazzari, and 
Mayer, forthcoming) to 1.00 (the value implied by a Cobb-Douglas production function) to 1.20 
(Schaller, 2006).  Given this range of elasticities, high-price firms accumulate between 15.1% 
and 45.2% too much capital.  While high-price firms comprise 20% of the sample, their mean 
capital stock is approximately half as large as that for the mean firm (see Table 1.B.).    Taken 
together, these figures roughly imply a reduction of 1.5% to 4.5% of the capital stock for 
publicly traded firms.  It takes a substantial period of time for these excesses to be reversed by 
the depreciation of capital (though the adjustment process could be accelerated by a reduction in 
planned investment spending).  Five years after a bubble, nearly one-half of the misallocated 
capital would remain.   The effects of bubbles on misallocating capital are substantial and may 
be long-lasting.    
 
5.   Robustness Checks 
  This section presents a series of robustness checks on the Euler equation and the core 
result that both the standard and overinvestment stories are empirically relevant.   
5.1.  Cost Shocks  
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  The results discussed so far have been based on demand shocks as a measure of 
investment opportunities.  In this sub-section, we turn instead to cost shocks.  Specifically, we 
use low (or perhaps negative) recent growth in the Cost/Sales ratio to identify firms with good 
investment opportunities.  Favorable cost shock observations are defined as those with a change 
in the ratio of nominal costs to nominal sales over the previous three years in the bottom quartile.  
  The results based on cost shocks are presented the column (2) of Table 2, and the results 
strongly parallel those with demand shocks.  In particular,  PIO μ is negative and statistically and 
economically significant, and  GIO μ  is not statistically far from zero.   The difference between 
these two discount rate wedges is somewhat smaller than in column 1; nonetheless, the Wald 
statistic confirms that this difference is statistically significant.  
5.2.  Long Horizons 
   Stein (1996) develops a theoretical model in which a bubble induces a firm to use a 
discount rate lower than the risk-adjusted rate if the manager has short horizons or the financing 
constraint is binding.  In the former case, a bubble presents short-horizon managers with an 
opportunity in the form of cheap equity without the attending costs when a bubble becomes 
widely known.  In the latter case, a bubble presents financially-constrained managers with an 
opportunity to relax a binding constraint.  According to the Stein model, the discount rates of 
firms with long horizons and without a financing constraint at the time of portfolio formation 
will be unaffected by a bubble.  
To test this latter prediction, we need to identify a class of firms that is financially 
unconstrained and whose managers have short horizons.  High-price firms are unlikely to have 
binding finance constraints.  We identify firms with short horizons on the basis of their share 
turnover.  The intuition is simple.  Investors care about the performance of the firm until when 
they sell their shares.  When turnover is high -- and the expected duration of share ownership is 
therefore low -- the median shareholder will tend to care less about the firm’s performance in the 
more distant future.  As a result, managers may behave as if they have a short horizon.  Horizons 
are measured by share turnover, defined as the mean (over the year) of the daily ratio of the 
volume of shares traded to shares outstanding at the end of the day.  Firms with long horizons are 
those with share turnover in the prior year above the median for all observations in the prior year.    
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Euler equation estimates of the discount rate wedge for firms with high-prices and low 
share turnover are presented in column (3) of Table 2.  The model delivers sensible results for 
the adjustment cost function and the J statistic.  More importantly, these results document that 
the prediction of the Stein model is consistent with the data.  The estimated discount rate wedge 
for high-price firms with long horizons is small and statistically insignificant.   
5.3.  Restricted Models 
  The results presented in Table 2 have defined discount rate wedges in order to evaluate 
hypotheses suggested by the theory.  This sub-section takes a different but complementary 
approach and estimates a series of restricted models.  These misspecified models are useful in 
assessing the standard and overinvestment stories and are evaluated by the J statistic.  
  Table 3 contains estimates of several restricted models.  We begin with our  
benchmark model presented in column (1) of Table 2 (with investment opportunities measured 
by demand shocks) and constrain the discount rate wedge for firms with good investment 
opportunities ( GIO μ ) equal to zero.  The estimates are extremely similar to those for the 
benchmark model; for example, the coefficient on  PIO μ changes by less than two percent.  
Specification issues arise, however, when  PIO μ  is constrained to zero in column (2).  In this 
case, the J statistic rises sharply and has a p-value of 0.020 that indicates model misspecification.  
Given these results, it is not surprising that when both discount rate wedges are constrained to 
zero, the J statistic indicates that the model remains misspecified.   
  These results are confirmed in columns (4) through (6) when investment opportunities are 
measured by cost shocks.  The only difference is that when  PIO μ  is constrained to zero in 
column (5), the p-value of 0.105 is slightly above the conventional cutoff of 0.100. 
  Taken together, the results in Table 3 confirm the findings that both the standard and 
overinvestment stories describe subsets of high-price firms.  
6.   Conclusions 
This paper considers the possibility that the stock market occasionally overvalues firm 
and these bubbles lead to overinvestment.  If stock prices rise above fundamental values (a 
possibility suggested by much recent academic literature), firms would have access to a 
relatively cheap source of finance that results in an increase in investment.  For these overvalued  
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It t 0 1 G[ I, K : , ] αα  3.743 4.032 3.964 2.331 4.696 3.942 
II t t 0 1 G[ I , K: , ] αα  0.453 0.488 0.483 0.311 0.506 0.446 
 
 
















N  55,021 55,021 55,021 53,038 53,038 53,038 
 
Notes 




firms, the added investment represents a misallocation of capital, and thus financial market  
bubbles have real effects.  This overinvestment story contrasts with the standard story of stock 
markets efficiently allocating capital to its best uses.   
This paper presents empirical evidence to differentiate between the standard and 
overinvestment stories.  Our primary tests rely on the discount rates guiding investment 
decisions.  The standard story predicts that high-price firms with good investment opportunities 
should have discount rates that do not differ systematically from the risk-adjusted market rate.  
(The Stein model also predicts that the pattern of discount rates used by firms that are financially 
unconstrained and owned by shareholders with long horizons should be similar to the standard 
story.)  The misallocation story predicts that high-price firms with poor investment opportunities 
should have discount rates consistently below the market rate.  The discount rates guiding 
investment decisions are unobservable but are revealed by examining the intertemporal pattern of 
investment implied by the Euler equation for investment and variation in panel data.  
  Based on a panel dataset of over 50,000 firm-year observations, we find support for both 
stories.  The investment behavior of high-price firms with good investment opportunities is 
consistent with the standard story.  However, the overinvestment story best describes the 
behavior of high-price firms with poor investment opportunities.  Our estimates indicate that 
high-price firms (with both poor and good investment opportunities) accumulate between 15.1% 
and 45.2% too much capital as a result of a stock market bubble.  Even before they burst, 
bubbles adversely affect economic activity by misallocating capital.  The overinvestment story is 
further supported by a series of robustness checks on the Euler equation.   Our overall conclusion 
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A.1.  Construction of High-Price and Low-Price Portfolios 
 
We construct the high-price and low-price portfolios using the Sales/Price ratio.  The 
Sales/Price ratio is Net Sales (CompuStat item 12) divided by Common Shares Outstanding 
(CompuStat item 25) times Price – Fiscal Year – Close (CompuStat item 199).  Observations 
with missing or non-positive values for the Sales/Price ratio are dropped.  The remaining 
observations for a given year are sorted into deciles.  The top two deciles are classified as low-
price firms (i.e., firms with low stock market prices relative to the Sales/Price ratio).  The bottom 
two deciles are classified as high-price firms (i.e., firms with high stock market prices), and the 
remaining deciles are classified as typical.    
 
A.2.  Capital Stock and Investment 
For the first observation for firm f, the capital stock is based on the net plant (NPLANT), 
the nominal book value of net property, plant, and equipment (CompuStat item 8).  To convert 
this to real terms, we divide by the sector-specific price index for investment (p
I).  Since book 
value is not adjusted for changes in the value of capital goods purchased in the past, we adjust 


















=         ( A 1 )  
 
where s is a sector index (for firm i’s sector) and  0
i t is the year of the first observation for firm i. 
 
  Failure to adjust book value affects the initial value of the capital stock but has a 
geometrically decreasing impact on the measured capital stock over time.  After 15 years, the 
initial value effect is negligible.  We use this fact to construct the adjustment factor for the initial 
value of the capital stock.  For sector s, AF is (the ratio of current cost net stock of private fixed 
assets by industry to the historical-cost net stock of private fixed assets by industry) times (the 
ratio of the mean unadjusted capital stock for firms of age 15 or greater to the mean of what the 
unadjusted capital stock would have been measured as, if t equaled  0
i t (i.e., if the current year 
were the firm's first year in the sample)).  In effect, AF is the ratio of the true capital stock to the 
unadjusted initial value. 
 
  For subsequent observations, a standard perpetual inventory method is used to construct 

















=− +        ( A 2 )  
 
where δ is the depreciation rate and KCHG is gross additions to the firm’s capital stock.  The 
firm reports the additions in nominal terms, so we divide by p




  In the standard case, KCHG is gross investment (I), which is capital expenditures in the 
firm’s financial statements (CompuStat item 128).  CompuStat does not always have reliable 
data for the additions to the capital stock associated with large acquisitions.  We use a modified 
version of the algorithm of Chirinko, Fazzari, and Meyer (1999) to adjust KCHG for acquisitions 
and divestitures.  In the case of a substantial acquisition, we can use accounting identities to 
derive a more accurate measure of the additions to the capital stock: 
 
   ,, , , it it it it DGPLANT I ACQUIS RETIRE =+ −       ( A 3 )  
 
where DGPLANT is the change in GPLANT from the end of year t-1 to the end of year t and 
GPLANT is gross property, plant, and equipment (CompuStat item 7), ACQUIS is acquisitions, 
and RETIRE is retirements of capital stock (CompuStat item 184).  (When data on RETIRE is 
missing, we assume that the reason is that firms do not report any retirements in their financial 
statements, and we therefore assign a value of 0 to RETIRE for these observations.)  We use the 











>         ( A 4 )  
 
then we calculate the gross change in the capital stock as 
 
   ,, , it it it KCHG DGPLANT RETIRE =+        ( A 5 )  
 











< −        ( A 6 )  
 
we calculate the change in the capital stock as 
 
   ,, , 1 ,
I
it it it st KCHG DNPLANT K p δ − =+          ( A 7 )  
 
where DNPLANT is the change in NPLANT (as defined above).  (To see this result, start with 
the perpetual inventory equation,  ,, , 1 , , 1 , 1 , (1 ) it it it it it it it KI K KK K I δ δ −− − = +− → − + = .  Now, 
put the previous equation in nominal terms,  ,, 1 , 1 , []
II I
it it s it s it s KKp K pI p δ −− − += →  
,, 1 , , , ,
II
it it st it st it D N P L A N T K pI pK C H G δ − += = .)  Because NPLANT in the firm's financial 
statements will deduct depreciation (as well as accounting for the divestiture), depreciation must 
be added to KCHG to avoid deducting depreciation twice. 
 
If GPLANT is missing (or equal to zero) or DGPLANT  is missing, it is not feasible to 




In some cases, there is a data gap for a particular firm.  In this case, we treat the first new 
observation for that firm in the same way as we would if it were the initial observation.  This 
avoids any potential sample selection bias that would result from dropping firms with gaps in 
their data. 
 














δ =         ( A 8 )  
 
where D$ is current-cost depreciation of private fixed assets by sector (BEA, Table 3.4ES), 
DQUANT is the chain-type quantity index of depreciation of private fixed assets by sector 
(BEA, Table 3.5ES), K$ is the current cost net stock of private fixed assets by sector (as defined 
above), and KQUANT is the chain-type quantity index of the net stock of private fixed assets by 
sector (BEA, Table 3.2ES). 
 












=         ( A 9 )  
 
where I$ is historical-cost investment in private fixed assets by sector (BEA, Table 3.7ES) and 
IQUANT is the chain-type quantity index of investment in private fixed assets by sector (BEA, 
Table 3.8ES). 
 
A.3.  Tax-Adjusted Relative Price of Investment Goods 










= ⎜⎟ − ⎝⎠
I






        ( A 1 0 )  
 
where z is the present value of depreciation allowances, u is the investment tax credit rate, τ  is 
the corporate tax rate, p
I@ is the price of investment goods, and p
Y is the price of output.  Where 
variables are available at a monthly or quarterly frequency, we take the average for the calendar 
year.  The corporate tax rate is the U.S. federal tax rate on corporate income.  The present value 
of depreciation allowances – for non-residential equipment and structures, respectively – were 
provided by Dale Jorgenson.  To calculate z, we took the weighted sum of Jorgenson's z’s for 
equipment and structures, where the weights are the share of equipment investment and the share 
of structures investment (for a given year) in nominal gross private non-residential investment in 
fixed assets from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (from table 1IHI, where equipment 
investment is referred to as equipment and software).  Because the investment tax credit applies 
only to equipment, u=0 for structures, we multiply the statutory ITC rate for each year by the 
ratio of equipment investment to the sum of structures and equipment investment for that year.   
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The corporate tax rates were provided directly by the Treasury Department, and investment tax 
credit rates are drawn from Pechman (1987, p.160-161).  The sector-specific price index for 
output is the implicit price deflator for Gross Domestic Product by industry produced by the 
BEA, normalized to 1 in 1996.  
 
A.4.   The Real Risk-Adjusted Market Discount Rate 
  The real, risk-adjusted market discount rate is defined as follows,  
 
   , it r   =  ((1+ ,
NOM
it r ) / (1+
e
t π ))  -  1.0.       (A11) 
 
The equity risk premium is calculated using CAPM.  The components of ri,t are defined and 




it r     =  Nominal, short-term, risk-adjusted cost of capital, 
  =   λs (1-τt) 
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, NOM DEBT
t r   =  Nominal corporate bond rate (Moody’s Seasoned Baa Corporate  





st r   =  Nominal, short-term, risk-adjusted cost of equity capital for firms in sector s, 
  =      
, NOM F
t r   +  σs, 
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s t π     =  Sector-specific capital goods price inflation rate from t to t+1.  Sector-
specific data was not yet available for 2002 at the time of data 
construction, so the inflation rate for nonresidential fixed investment was 
used for  ,
e
s t π  for 2001, 
 
σs   =  Equity  risk  premium, 
 
τt    =  Marginal rate of corporate income taxation, 
 
λs    =  Sector-specific leverage ratio calculated as the mean of book debt for the 





Under the CAPM,  
 
  σs  =  βs (φ
EQUITY -  φ




βs   =  CAPM  β for sector s 
 
φ
EQUITY  =  Total return on equities from 1950-2001.  The source is the value-
weighted CRSP index (including dividends)  
 
φ
F  =  Total return on risk-free Treasury bills from 1950-2001.  The source is the  
FRED database, specifically the series for 1-Year Treasury Constant 
Maturity Rate 
 
A.5.   Bubbles and Overinvestment 
This section provides the details underlying the calculations reported in Section IV.  
Three steps are required to translate the discount rate wedge of  PIO 0.195 μ= −  into the amount 
of misallocated capital for high-price firms. 
 
First, we translate the estimate of the discount rate wedgesthat apply to the lowest and 
highest quartile (measured by investment opportunities) of high-price firms to all high-price 
firms.  We know that the discount rate wedges are  PIO 0.195 μ= −  and  GIO 0.004 μ= −  for the 
lowest and highest quartile of high-price firms, respectively.  We assume that this wedge 
declines evenly between these two extremes, and hence the discount rate wedges for all four 
quartiles are -0.195, -0.131, -0.068, and -0.004.  (This procedure is numerically equivalent to 
averaging the estimates of  PIO μ  and  GIO μ .)  The average value for the change in the discount 
rate wedge for all high-price firms is  0.100 Δμ=− .  
  
Second, the user cost of capital can be represented as follows, 
 
  UC (r )*RP*TAX =+ μ + δ ,         ( A 1 3 )  
 
where r is the real, risk-adjusted discount rate discussed above, μ is the discount rate wedge, δ  
is the economic rate of capital depreciation, RP is the relative price of investment goods, and 
TAX represents a collection of tax variables (income tax and investment credit rates; value of tax 
depreciation).  The percentage change in the user cost evaluated at  0 μ =  is computed as follows, 
 
  %U C / ( r ) Δ= Δ μ+ δ .          ( A 1 4 )  
 
Based on the dataset, the mean value of r is 0.120 and δ  is 0.145.  Based on these figures, the 
percentage change in the user cost equals, 
 
  %ΔUC Δμ /(r δ) 0.100/(0.120 0.145) 0.377 =+ = − += − .        (A15)  
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  Third, per the discussion in Section 4, we assume that the elasticity of substitution 
between capital and other factors (σ) is between 0.40 and 1.20.  Thus, the lower and upper 
bounds of the percentage change in the capital stock is computed according to this formula, 
 
  %ΔK σ*(%ΔUC) {0.151, 0.452} =− = .       ( A 1 6 )  